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STANNO FALLENDO MOLTE BANCHE CON I VOSTRI SOLDI

STANNO FALLENDO MOLTE BANCHE CON I VOSTRI SOLDI

banche italiane fallite fallimento banca italia

 

Noi lo avevamo scritto quasi un anno fa, la stampa mondiale lo diceva, tranne i mezzi di comunicazione italiani che idiotizzano la popolazione. Il Monte dei Paschi di Siena è fallito, ma continua a fare danni. Lo stato italiano ha imposto a questa banca di emettere azioni e lo stato ha dato loro in cambio denaro. Il risultato è:

-viene socializzato il costo fra tutti i sudditi dello stato italiano

-gli azionisti non possono essere liquidati e ci sono migliaia di famiglie sull’astrico

-vengono privatizzati i profitti dei soliti direttori e farabbutti della politica e finanza.

Assieme al Monte dei Paschi stanno fallendo altre banche.

Per le informazioni che ci arrivano, molte banche ritardano pagamenti, emettono assegni circolari, tolgono fidi svuotando ad insaputa i conti dei clienti, non possono più assolvere ai loro doveri azionari e obbligazionari. I rapporti di Moody pubblicati un anno fa si rivelano in tutta la loro realtà. Molte banche stanno fallendo e state sicuri che tv, giornali e radio italiane censurano e continueranno a dirvi che tutto va bene, che la situazione è sotto controllo, di non farvi prendere dal panico, che l’italia è al sicuro e di continuare a ad avere fiducia nei politici e ladri di turno.

Vi lasciamo di nuovo al rapporto Moody che oggi più che mai si rivela vero.

BANCA POPOLARE DI MAROSTICA

Banca Popolare di Marostica’s standalone BFSR was downgraded to D (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2) from C-, baa2. Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba2/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa2/Prime-2.

The downgrade of the standalone BFSR reflects the bank’s weak and deteriorating asset quality — arising from the Italian banking system’s difficult operating environment — low funding diversification, as well as the continued integration and de-risking challenges stemming from the bank’s acquisition of Banca Treviso. Low funding diversification has resulted in a relatively low central bank eligible assets portfolio which makes the bank vulnerable in a liquidity stress scenario and in the medium term will weigh on profitability given the increase of retail funding costs. Capital adequacy is sufficient to withstand both our central and stress scenario analysis.

The Ba1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba1 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank’s ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

UNICREDIT SPA

UniCredit’s standalone credit assessment was lowered to baa2 from baa1, within the C- standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) category, which was confirmed at this level, whilst its long- and short-term deposit and debt ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1. The outlook on the C- standalone BFSR and on the A3 long-term deposit rating is negative.

Moody’s says that the lowering of the standalone credit assessment to baa2 reflects (i) UniCredit’s weakening profitability and asset quality; (ii) its restricted access to market funding; and (iii) the increasingly difficult operating environment that the group faces, particularly in the Italian market, where conditions have deteriorated significantly since H1 2011. The expectation that these rating drivers may persist for some time, and possibly intensify, underlies the negative outlook on the bank’s standalone BFSR.

The rating agency notes that in this environment, the financial targets set out in the bank’s November 2011 strategic plan, including a net profit of EUR3.8 billion by 2013, and EUR6.5 billion by 2015, are likely to have become more difficult to achieve. Pre-provision operating profit for 2011 declined by 9.4% to EUR9.7 billion. Gross impaired loans increased by 6.3% in 2011, with the increase relating mainly to exposures in Italy, and this trend has continued in Q1 2012. Although UniCredit has significant geographic diversification, Italy remains its single largest market, and conditions in the country will therefore significantly affect the group’s performance. With Italy now in recession, there is potential for profitability and asset quality to weaken further during 2012.

Moody’s notes that UniCredit has a relatively robust liquidity framework, including a substantial portfolio of ECB eligible assets, which are sufficient to cover wholesale maturities for a period significantly in excess of 12 months. However, the rating agency notes that UniCredit has significant reliance on confidence sensitive, more restricted, and costly funding sources, and there is a risk that the current more restricted and costly market access will continue for an extended period. Uncertainty regarding when UniCredit will again be able to fund itself regularly — and on an economic basis — is therefore a key credit and rating driver. The group’s geographic diversification does however provide some benefits. UniCredit’s operations in certain markets, such as Germany, improve its funding diversification and provide some mitigant to a more sensitive funding market in Italy.

Moody’s notes that UniCredit’s capital adequacy has been strengthened, through the successful completion of a EUR7.5 billion capital increase in January 2012, contributing to a Core Tier 1 ratio of 10.3% at March 2012. This has provided a more substantial buffer against potential losses, also in Moody’s stressed scenario.

Moody’s also acknowledges the group’s strong franchises in several markets, including Italy, where the profitability of UniCredit’s commercial banking business has improved in 2011 and into the first quarter of 2012. However, further improvements may prove more challenging given the recession in Italy.

Important elements that limited the lowering of BCA to one notch only are (i) the resilience of the group’s profitability, stemming from its wide geographic and business-line diversification; and (ii) the strengthening of capital adequacy, after the recent capital raising.

UniCredit’s A3 long-term deposit and debt rating is now at the same level as the Italian sovereign, and benefits from a very high expectation of systemic support, resulting in a two notch uplift from the BCA. The outlook on the A3 long-term deposit rating is negative, reflecting both the negative outlook on the Italian government bond rating, and the negative outlook on UniCredit’s standalone BFSR.

 

INTESA SANPAOLO

Intesa Sanpaolo’s standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was downgraded to C- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa1) from C+/a2. At the same time, Moody’s downgraded Intesa’s long- and short-term debt and deposit ratings to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1, directly following the downgrade of Intesa’s standalone BFSR. The outlook on the C- standalone BFSR and on the the A3 long-term deposit rating is negative.

Moody’s says that the downgrade of Intesa’s BFSR to C-/baa1 from C+/a2 reflects the significant deterioration in the operating environment within Italy since the middle of 2011 and the negative effects this is having on Italian banks’ profitability, asset quality and access to market funding. This is highly relevant for Intesa, given its high focus on domestic business.

The Italian economy is now in recession, and economic conditions are unlikely to significantly improve for some time. Intesa’s asset quality continued to decline during 2011 and this is likely to deteriorate further in 2012. Moody’s said that it believes that the weak performance of its asset quality combined with the fragile economic conditions may lead to weaker profitability during 2012.

Moody’s notes that Intesa has a strong retail funding base and a substantial portfolio of ECB eligible assets, which are sufficient to cover wholesale maturities for a period significantly in excess of 12 months. However, the rating agency notes that there is a risk that restricted and costly market access will continue for an extended period. As a result, uncertainty regarding when Intesa will again be able to fund itself regularly — and on an economic basis — is a key credit risk and an important rating driver.

In terms of capital adequacy, Moody’s notes that this was considerably strengthened by the EUR5 billion capital increase completed in 2011, with a Core Tier 1 ratio of 10.1% at 2011 year-end, providing the bank with an adequate resilience to both the rating agency’s anticipated and stressed scenarios. Furthermore, and importantly, Moody’s also acknowledges Intesa’s leading and well diversified franchise in Italy, which supports the standalone credit assessment at its current level.

Moody’s adds that the difficult prospects for profitability and asset quality — and the uncertainties regarding market access — are important drivers underlying the negative outlook for the C- standalone

 

BFSR.

Intesa’s A3 long-term deposit rating is now at the same level as, and constrained by, the Italian sovereign rating. The A3 long-term deposit rating benefits from a very high expectation of systemic support, providing one notch of rating uplift from the baa1 standalone credit assessment. The outlook on the A3 long-term deposit and debt ratings is negative, reflecting the negative outlook on the Italian government bond rating, and on Intesa’s standalone BFSR.

 

BANCA IMI

Banca IMI’s long- and short-term debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1, directly following the downgrade of the ratings of its parent Intesa Sanpaolo (Intesa). The outlook on the bank’s C- standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa2, was changed to negative from stable.

Intesa Sanpaolo’s standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was downgraded to C- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa1) from C+/a2, while its long- and short-term debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1.

The downgrade of Banca IMI’s deposit ratings reflects the lower capability of Intesa to provide support, as evidenced by the downgrade of its own standalone BFSR and long-term deposit ratings. Banca IMI’s A3 long-term deposit rating benefits from a very high expectation of parental support, providing two notches of rating uplift from its baa2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for Banca IMI’s standalone BFSR was changed to negative from stable, reflecting the challenges for profitability and asset quality arising from the difficult operating environment within Italy. The outlook for the bank’s A3 long-term deposit rating is negative, reflecting the negative outlook on its standalone BFSR, and also the negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating of its parent and support provider, Intesa.

 

BANCA CR FIRENZE

Banca CR Firenze’s (Carifirenze) long- and short-term debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1, directly following the downgrade of the ratings of its parent Intesa Sanpaolo (Intesa). The outlook on the bank’s C- standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa2, was changed to negative from stable.

Intesa Sanpaolo’s standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was downgraded to C- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa1) from C+/a2, while its long- and short-term debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1.

The downgrade of Carifirenze’s deposit ratings reflects the lower capability of Intesa to provide support, as evidenced by the downgrade of its own standalone BFSR and long-term deposit ratings. Carifirenze’s A3 long-term deposit rating benefits from a very high expectation of parental support, providing two notches of rating uplift from its baa2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for Carifirenze’s standalone BFSR was changed to negative from stable, reflecting the challenges for profitability and asset quality arising from the difficult operating environment within Italy. The outlook for the bank’s A3 long-term deposit rating is negative, reflecting the negative outlook on its standalone BFSR, and also the negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating of its parent and support provider, Intesa.

 

BANCA MONTE PARMA

Banca Monte Parma’s long-term deposit rating was downgraded to Baa1 from A3, directly following the downgrade of the ratings of its parent Intesa Sanpaolo (Intesa). The outlook on the bank’s D+ standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa3, was changed to negative from stable.

Intesa’s standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was downgraded to C- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa1) from C+/a2, while its long- and short-term debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1.

The downgrade of Banca Monte Parma’s long-term deposit rating reflects the lower capability of Intesa to provide support, as evidenced by the downgrade of its own standalone BFSR and long-term deposit ratings. Banca Monte Parma’s Baa1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a very high expectation of parental support, providing two notches of rating uplift from its baa3 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for Banca Monte Parma’s standalone BFSR was changed to negative from stable, reflecting the challenges for profitability and asset quality arising from the difficult operating environment within Italy. The outlook for the bank’s Baa1 long-term deposit rating is negative, reflecting the negative outlook on its standalone BFSR, and also the negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating of its parent and support provider, Intesa.

 

BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena’s (MPS) standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D, mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2, from D+ / baa3, its long-term debt and deposit ratings to Baa3 from Baa1 and its short-term debt and deposit ratings to Prime-3 from Prime-2. The outlook on all ratings is negative.

Moody’s says that the lowering of MPS’ standalone credit assessment reflects pressures on financial fundamentals arising from the difficult operating environment in Italy and the impact of restricted and costly access to market funding. In particular, Moody’s notes MPS’ increased capital needs deriving from the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) requirement that the bank cover its sovereign exposures by June 2012, as well as the challenges the bank has in meeting these capital requirements. MPS’ asset quality has deteriorated significantly (to 12.1% Problem Loans/Gross Loans in 2011) and Moody’s expects this trend to continue, whereas profitability is weak and likely to come under further pressure this year, exposing MPS’ vulnerability to our stress scenario.

MPS’ funding profile also shows some heightened reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands at 11%), with a significant reliance on foreign investors. Due to the restricted market access, MPS’ reliance on ECB funding has increased substantially, whereas Moody’s liquidity-gap analysis over a 12 month horizon suggests a significant dependence on ECB funding. In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the two-notch lowering of MPS’ standalone credit assessment to ba2.

The bank’s national market share remains the key factor underpinning our standalone credit assessment at its current level.

The Baa3 long-term deposit rating benefits from our very high expectation of systemic support, providing two notches of uplift from the ba2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, reflecting the challenging operating environment and uncertainties on covering the bank’s capital needs and future market access.

 

MPS CAPITAL SERVICES

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded the standalone BFSR of MPS Capital Services (MPSCS) to D- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba3) from D+/ ba1. At the same time, Moody’s downgraded MPSCS’s long-term deposit ratings to Baa3 from Baa2 and its short-term deposit ratings to Prime-3 from Prime-2. The outlook on the aforementioned ratings is negative, in line with the parent (Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena).

According to Moody’s, the two-notch downward adjustment of the standalone credit assessment to ba3 primarily reflects the bank’s weak asset quality, which exposes the bank’s vulnerability to our stress scenario.

Moody’s also acknowledges the bank’s integration with and ongoing funding from the parent, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), underpinning the D-/ba3 standalone ratings

MPSCS’s Baa3 long-term deposit rating benefits from three-notch uplift from our assessment of the very high probability of support from the parent Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS, rated Baa3; D/ba2) in the event of a crisis.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, in line with the parent.

 

BANCO POPOLARE SOCIETA’ COOPERATIVA

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded the long- and short-term deposit ratings of Banco Popolare (BP) to Baa3/Prime-3 (negative outlook) from Baa2/Prime-2. Concurrently, BP’s standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was confirmed at D+, but the standalone credit assessment was lowered to ba1 (formerly baa3).

Moody’s says that key drivers of the one-notch lowering of the standalone credit assessment are pressures on capital, asset quality and internal capital generation stemming from the challenging operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly access to market funding. In particular, Moody’s notes that BP has a low (7.3%) Core Tier 1 ratio and displays a capital shortfall in relation to the higher capital requirements (9%) mandated by the European Banking Authority (EBA) — to which it must comply with by end-June 2012.

Moody’s believes BP should be able to reach the 9% EBA target, as it largely depends on regulatory approval of the Advanced Internal Ratings Based (AIRB) model. Asset quality and internal capital generation are both modest and unlikely to improve in 2012. However, despite the lower capital levels than similar rated peers, BP is less sensitive, but still vulnerable, under Moody’s stress scenarios. The bank’s relatively high reliance on market funds (and a largely international investor base) caused a recent surge in ECB reliance, highlighting the bank’s funding vulnerabilities and exposing it to a significant deleveraging or an ongoing reliance on ECB funding in the case that funding markets do not normalize soon, with both scenarios containing risks and potentially contributing to further negative ratings pressure.

BP’s Baa3 long-term debt and deposit ratings benefit from a one-notch uplift from the bank’s standalone credit assessment based on Moody’s assessment of a high probability of systemic support.

The outlook is negative reflecting the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access.

 

BANCA ITALEASE

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded the long-term deposit ratings of Banca Italease (Italease) to Ba1 from Baa3 and its short-term deposit ratings to Not-Prime from Prime-3. The standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) — which was not subject to the rating review — remains at E+, mapping to a standalone credit assessment of b1.

Moody’s says that the downgrade of Italease’s Ba1 long-term deposit rating follows the one-notch downgrade of the parent Banco Popolare (rated Baa3; D+/ba1), reducing the parental support uplift from the standalone credit assessment to three notches (from four notches).

The outlook on all Italease’s ratings is negative, in line with the parent, but also reflecting the bank’s relatively high standalone rating positioning at E+/b1 for a company in run-off situation.

 

UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded the standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of Unione di Banche Italiane (UBI) to D+ with a negative outlook (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa3), from C- / baa1 and its long-term global local currency (GLC) deposit rating to Baa2 (negative outlook) from A3.

Moody’s says that the downgrade of the standalone BFSR reflects pressures on capital and profitability from the difficult operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly access to market funding. Moody’s acknowledges UBI’s capital needs to comply with the more stringent standards of the European Banking Authority (EBA), and the current ratings incorporate the expectation that UBI will achieve compliance with the 9% EBA target. Profitability is low and has deteriorated more than some of its peers, and is likely to come under further pressure in 2012, exposing UBI’s vulnerability under our stress scenario.

UBI’s funding profile also shows some heightened reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands at 8.4%), with a meaningful reliance on foreign investors. Due to the restricted market access, UBI’s reliance on ECB funding has increased to a significant level.

In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the downgrade of UBI’s standalone ratings to D+/baa3.

Moody’s also notes the bank’s strong market shares, which support the baa3 standalone credit assessment.

UBI’s long-term global local currency (GLC) deposit rating is at the Baa2 level, based on Moody’s assessment of a high probability of systemic support, which results in one-notch uplift from the baa3 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, reflecting the challenging operating environment and uncertainties on future.

 

BANCA POPOLARE DI MILANO

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded the subordinated and Tier III debt and MTN program ratings of Banca Popolare di Milano to Ba2 (from Ba1) and its junior subordinated MTN program rating to (P)Ba3 (from (P)Ba2). All other ratings and negative outlook are unaffected by this rating action.

Moody’s says that the downgrade reflects the removal of the systemic support uplift (one notch in the bank’s case) from subordinated and Tier III and notch widening for junior subordinated debt rating, in line with other Italian banks.

 

BANCA CARIGE

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded the following ratings of Banca Carige (Carige): its standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+ from C- (the standalone BFSR now maps to a standalone credit assessment of baa3, formerly baa2). At the same time, Carige’s long-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1. The aforementioned ratings now carry a negative outlook.

Moody’s says that the key drivers for the one-notch downgrade of the standalone BFSR are pressure on capital from the challenging operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly access to market funding. Carige reported a very low 6.7% Core Tier 1 ratio, exposing the bank’s vulnerability to our stress scenario; however, Moody’s understands that a strengthening of this ratio is likely during 2012 through valorisation of goodwill. Carige’s funding profile shows lower-than peers reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands at 1.1%), with a moderate reliance on foreign investors. And even though Carige’s reliance on ECB funding has increased due to the restricted market access, we believe this is more manageable than for many of its peers whose dependence has become much more significant.

In Moody’s opinion, the rating is underpinned by the bank’s 25-30% market shares in Carige’s home region, contributing to adequate profitability, which is more resilient than peers.

In combination, these factors have limited the extent of the downgrade to one notch and a standalone rating at D+/baa3, higher than many of its peers.

The outlook on all ratings is nevertheless negative, reflecting the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access which may continue to place pressure also on Banca Carige.

 

CREDITO EMILIANO

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded the standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of Credito Emiliano (Credem) to D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa3), from C-/baa1). At the same time, its long-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Baa2 from A3. The outlook on all ratings is negative.

According to Moody’s, the key drivers for the one-notch downgrade of the BFSR reflect pressure on capital from the difficult operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly access to market funding. Credem’s Italian government bond portfolio is larger than average, which, together with the bank’s exposure to small and medium-sized enterprises, renders Credem vulnerable under Moody’s adverse scenario analysis, which factors in a mark-to-market stressed valuation loss on holdings of sovereign bonds.

Moody’s notes that Credem’s funding profile also shows some heightened reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands at 4.8%), with a low reliance on foreign investors. Due to restricted market access, Credem’s reliance on ECB funding has increased substantially whereas Moody’s liquidity-gap analysis over a 12 month horizon suggests a significant dependence on ECB funding.

In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the downgrade of Credem’s standalone BFSR.

In Moody’s opinion, the rating is supported by Credem’s satisfactory asset quality and profitability, which indicates a somewhat greater resilience of Credem against the pressures from the operating environment than its lower-rated peers.

Credem’s Baa2 long-term deposit ratings benefit from a one-notch uplift from the bank’s standalone credit assessment based on Moody’s assessment of a moderate probability of systemic support.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, reflecting the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access.

 

CREDITO VALTELLINESE

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded Credito Valtellinese’s (Creval) standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C- / baa2, its long-term deposit ratings to Baa3 from Baa1 and its short-term deposit ratings to Prime-3 from Prime-2.

Moody’s says that the key drivers of the BFSR downgrade were pressure on the bank’s asset quality arising from the difficult operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly access to market funding. Moody’s believes Creval has modest asset quality coupled with a low capital adequacy, even considering the conversion of a convertible bond in May 2012, which expose the bank’s vulnerability under our stressed scenario. Creval’s funding profile also shows some heightened reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands at 10%), with a low reliance on foreign investors. Due to restricted market access, Creval’s reliance on ECB funding has increased substantially.

In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the downgrade of Creval’s standalone BFSR.

In Moody’s opinion, the rating is supported by Creval’s profitability, which is more resilient than that of peers, and largely due to lower goodwill impairment than larger banks.

Creval’s Baa3 long-term deposit ratings benefit from a one-notch uplift from the bank’s standalone credit assessment based on Moody’s assessment of a moderate probability of systemic support.

The outlook is negative reflecting the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access.

 

BANCA DELLE MARCHE

Banca delle Marche’s standalone BFSR was downgraded to D (mapping to a ba2 standalone credit assessment) from C-, mapping to baa2. Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba1/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa1/Prime-1.

The lowering of the standalone credit strength reflects the challenges the bank faces — caused by restricted and more expensive wholesale funding — as well as the pressures on profitability and asset quality arising from the Italian banking system’s difficult operating environment. Banca delle Marche’s asset quality declined sharply during 2011, and there is potential for it to deteriorate further in 2012. As of year-end 2011, problem loans as percentage of gross loans stood at 12.2% (2011: 8.3%), which is significantly worse than average, and in the current conditions, there seems little prospect for improvement in profitability or asset quality in the next 12 months. The recent capital increase, completed in Q1 2012, increases the bank’s Tier 1 ratio to about 8.3% (from 7.2% at year-end 2011) and provides an additional buffer for potential credit losses. Funding remains restricted and more costly. We note that Banca delle Marche’s use of central bank funding is higher than its peers. However, this is partly mitigated by the bank’s solid retail funding base — which provides about 70% of the bank’s total funding — as well as a sufficient central bank eligible assets portfolio.

The Ba1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a moderate likelihood of systemic support, providing one notch of uplift from the ba2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank’s ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

 

BANCA SELLA HOLDING

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded Banca Sella’s (Sella) standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C- / baa2 and the bank’s long- and short-term deposit ratings to Baa3/Prime-3 from Baa1/Prime-2. The outlook is negative.

Moody’s says that the standalone BFSR’s downgrade captures Sella’s weak internal capital generation, low capital and modest asset quality, together exposing Sella’s vulnerability under Moody’s stress scenario.

However, Moody’s notes the bank’s above-average retail funding and revenue diversification. Sella’s funding profile shows lower-than peers reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands at negative 1.1%), with a low reliance on foreign investors. Due to restricted market access, Sella’s reliance on ECB funding has however increased whereas Moody’s liquidity-gap analysis over a 12 month horizon suggests a lower than peers dependence on ECB funding. Profitability, although modest, has deteriorated less than Italian peers.

In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the downgrade of Sella’s standalone financial strength rating.

Sella’s long term global local currency (GLC) deposit rating is Baa3, based on Moody’s expectation of a moderate probability of systemic support, providing a one notch uplift.

The outlook is negative reflecting the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access.

 

ICCREA BANCAIMPRESA

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded Iccrea BancaImpresa’s (Iccrea BI, formerly Banca Agrileasing) standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2) from D+/ba1, its long-term debt and deposit ratings to Ba1 from Baa2 and its short-term debt and deposit ratings to Not-Prime from Prime-2.

Moody’s says that the key drivers for the downgrade of the BFSR were the bank’s weak asset quality and low profitability, exposing the bank’s sensitivity to Moody’s stress scenario.

In Moody’s opinion, the downgrade of the deposit rating is also a reflection of Moody’s assessment of its support provider, the Italian co-operative credit banks (Banche di Credito Cooperativo or BCCs, unrated) given pressure from the challenging operating environment. This resulted in a one-notch reduction of the uplift from the ba2 standalone credit assessment, beyond what we had initially anticipated.

The outlook on all ratings is now negative, reflecting the difficult operating environment.

 

CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI BOLZANO

Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano’s standalone BFSR was downgraded to D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C/ baa2. Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba1/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa2/Prime-2.

The lowering of the standalone credit assessment reflects the challenges the bank faces — caused by restricted and more expensive wholesale funding, resulting in an increasing dependence on ECB funding or in significant deleveraging pressure if the bank was intending on reducing this funding — as well as the pressures on profitability and asset quality arising from the Italian banking system’s difficult operating environment. The bank is planning to increase its capital; this would provide an additional buffer against further credit losses, and enable the bank’s capital to withstand our anticipated stress scenario. However, capital would remain vulnerable in our stress scenario.

The Ba1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba1 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank’s ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

 

CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI FERRARA

Moody’s Investor Service has today downgraded the junior subordinated debt rating of Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara’s to (P)B2 from (P)B1.

Moody’s says that the downgrade reflects the widening of the notching to standalone credit assessment — 2 notches, from standalone credit assessment -1 notch, in line with other Italian banks. This follows the removal of systemic support for subordinated debt, which is now notched one notch below the standalone rating of banks (but incorporating group or parental support).

The outlook on the junior subordinated rating remains negative, in line with the bank’s standalone credit assessment of ba3.

 

BANCAPULIA

In May 2012, Moody’s changed the outlook on BancApulia’s ratings to negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

 

BANCA POPOLARE DELL’ALTO ADIGE

Banca Popolare dell’Alto Adige’s standalone BFSR was downgraded to D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C-/ baa1. Consequently, its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba1/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa1/Prime-2.

The downgrade of the standalone credit assessment reflects the bank’s weak profitability, which will continue to be further challenged given the weak operating environment, and scarce availability of and high competition for cost-effective retail funding and weakening asset quality. The downgrade also reflects the wholesale funding reliance, resulting in increasing ECB funding and which we expect will increase further in the coming 12 months. Capital adequacy withstands our central scenario, but remains vulnerable in the stressed scenario.

The Ba1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba1 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank’s ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

 

CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI CESENA

Cassa di Risparmio di Cesena’s standalone BFSR was downgraded to D- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba3) from D+ / baa3. Consequently, its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba3/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa3/Prime-3.

The downgrade of the standalone BFSR beyond initial expectations reflects the bank’s modest capital adequacy, as well as its weak and deteriorating asset quality arising from the Italian banking system’s difficult operating environment, which exposes the bank’s vulnerability to Moody’s scenario analysis, resulting in significant lower capital levels in our anticipated and to capital shortfalls in our stress scenario. The new rating levels also take into considerationthe bank’s reliance on market funds, resulting in an increasing dependence on ECB funding or in significant deleveraging pressure if the ECB was intent on reducing this funding.

The Ba3 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba3 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank’s ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

 

BANCA POPOLARE DI CIVIDALE

Banca Popolare di Cividale’s standalone BFSR was downgraded to D (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2) from C-/baa1. Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba2/Non-Prime respectively from Baa1/Prime-2.

The downgrade of the standalone BFSR reflects the funding challenges the bank faces, with higher central bank funding use relative to peers — caused by restricted and more expensive wholesale funding– as well as pressure on its asset quality and profitability (also due to the higher cost of retail funding). The bank’s use of central bank funding is above average and we expect this dependence to increase in the coming 12months. However, this is partially mitigated by a sizeable and increasing eligible assets portfolio.

The Ba2 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank’s ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

 

CASSA DI RISPARMIO DELLA PROVINCIA DI CHIETI

Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Chieti’s standalone BFSR was downgraded to D- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba3) from D+/ baa3. Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba3/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa3/Prime-3.

The downgrade of the standalone credit assessment below initial expectations was triggered by the bank’s weak and deteriorating asset quality — arising from the Italian banking system’s difficult operating environment — as well as weak core profitability and capital levels that could protect the bank against asset quality pressures. Capital levels are only just adequate under our central scenario, but remain vulnerable in the stress scenario.

The Ba3 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba3 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank’s ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

 

BANCA POPOLARE DI SPOLETO

Banca Popolare di Spoleto’s standalone BFSR was downgraded to D (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2) from C-/baa1. Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba2/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa1/Prime-2.

The lowering of the standalone credit assessment reflects the bank’s weak and deteriorating asset quality — caused by the challenging operating environment in the Italian banking system, the bank’s very weak profitability, with a loss recorded in 2011, that will continue to weaken given scarcity of cost-effective retail funding, as well as its dependence on ECB funding and capital levels. Capital levels are declining, and while sufficient under our central scenario, are vulnerable in the stress scenario. Another significant bank-specific rating driver is our view that BPS’s risk profile could increase as a result of the bank’s growth strategy (announced in H1 2011 and recently confirmed), which targets expansion outside of its traditional territory, in Italy’s major cities.

The combination of all these factors have lead to a four notch lowering off the standalone credit assessment.

The Ba2 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank’s ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

 

BANCA PADOVANA CREDITO COOPERATIVO

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded the long-term deposit ratings of Banca Padovana to Ba2 from Ba1. Banca Padovana’s standalone D- bank financial strength rating (BFSR) and its ba3 standalone credit assessment with a negative outlook were unaffected. All ratings now carry a negative outlook.

Moody’s says that the downgrade of Banca Padovana’s long-term rating reflects Moody’s assessment of its support provider, the group of Italian banche di credito cooperativo (BCCs, unrated), given the pressure from the challenging operating environment. This resulted in a reduction of the uplift provided to the bank’s long-term rating to one from two notches.

The outlook is negative, reflecting the significant challenges of turning around the bank in a difficult operating environment.

 

 

BANCA DELLA MARCA CREDITO COOPERATIVO

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded Banca della Marca Credito Cooperativo’s (Banca Marca) standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C-/baa1, its long-term deposit ratings to Baa3 from A3 and its short-term deposit ratings to Prime-3 from Prime-2.

Moody’s says that the key reasons for the downgrade of the BFSR were (i) the bank’s asset-side vulnerability, stemming from its small size and loan concentration and pressure on the bank’s profitability, which, although modest, deteriorated less than peers. These factors expose the bank’s sensitivity to Moody’s stress scenario; and (ii) the impact of restricted and costly access to market funding.

In combination, the above factors have largely contributed to the downgrade of the bank’s standalone BFSR.

Moody’s also acknowledges the bank’s above-average retail funding and capital. Banca Marca’s funding profile shows lower-than peers reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands effectively at zero), with a very low reliance on foreign investors. Due to the restricted market access, Banca Marca’s reliance on ECB funding has however increased whereas Moody’s liquidity-gap analysis over a 12 month horizon suggests a lower than peers dependence on ECB funding.

The Baa3 long-term deposit rating benefits from Moody’s expectation of moderate support from the Italian co-operative credit banks (Banche di Credito Cooperativo or BCCs, unrated), providing one notch of uplift from the ba1 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, reflecting the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access.

 

MEDIOCREDITO TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE

In May 2012, Moody’s lowered the standalone credit assessment of Mediocredito Trentino Alto Adige to ba1 from baa3, within the standalone D+ BFSR category. The bank’s long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Baa1/Prime 2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1.

The lowering of the standalone credit assessment reflects the challenges caused by restricted and more expensive wholesale funding access, as well as challenges that this presents to MTAA’s business model. The liquidity-gap analysis over a 12-month period reveals a significant dependence on central bank and shareholder funding.

The downgrade of the long-term deposit ratings reflects:

(i) The lower ba1 standalone credit assessment.

(ii) The downgrade on 15 February 2012 of the Autonomous Province of Trento and Autonomous Province of Bolzano to A1 (outlook negative) from Aa3. The Autonomous Province of Trento and Autonomous Province of Bolzano — together with the Autonomous Region of Trentino Alto Adige — own a controlling 52.5% stake in MTAA. MTAA’s ratings, which benefit from uplift from regional government support from these entities, are sensitive to any change in their ratings, and subsequently their ability to provide support to MTAA, if required.

(iii) A reassessment of the local-government support assumptions that Moody’s currently incorporates into MTAA’s deposit ratings, to reflect the evolving support environment across Europe.

The outlook for these ratings is negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term ratings reflects the negative outlook on the standalone BFSR, as well as the negative outlook on the two support providers, the Autonomous Province of Trento and Autonomous Province of Bolzano.

 

 

Recensionni dei maggiori giornali finanziari. di oggi

 

REUTERS
Moody downgrades 26 italian banks

Ratings agency Moody’s has cut its credit scores for 26 Italian banks, citing a gloomy outlook as recovery eludes the country. The announcement followed a day of further malaise on the markets.

In a statement released late on Monday, Moody’s said the move reflected the fact that banks were struggling in a tough economic climate.

The New York-based agency noted that the country had fallen back into recession, posing a threat to Rome’s recovery program and efforts to reduce public debt. Banks were struggling with losses on loans, a need for fresh funds and falling profits, it said.

“The ratings for Italian banks are now amongst the lowest within advanced European countries, reflecting these banks’ susceptibility to the adverse operating environments in Italy and Europe,” said a statement.

Premier Monti has put a tough austerity program into action

Particularly problematic was the fact that credit extensions were rising while earnings for financial institutes were falling, it noted.

Moody’s said the outlook for the banks was “negative,” indicating that further downgrades were likely.

It said that banks were particularly vulnerable to the renewed recession in Italy, given their already high levels of exposure to problem loans and weakened profitability.

Bigger banks fare better

Larger banks such as UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo were only downgraded one step, from A2 to A3, but a number of smaller institutions were downgraded by four steps.

Ten banks saw their ratings cut from investment grade to junk.

The news came on another day of bad news on European markets, with equities slumping and the euro tumbling to its lowest point against the US dollar since January, with the euro worth $1.283.

Italian benchmark yields rose to 5.697 percent, pushing up the amount of interest that Rome would have to pay to borrow money.

Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, whose technocrat government has imposed a tough austerity program, has seen his approval rating plunge from 71 to 38 percent since taking office in November.

rc/ncy (AFP, dpa, Reuters)

 

 

Moody’s cuts ratings for 26 Italian banks

By Vivianne Rodrigues in New York, Financial Times

Moody’s Investors Service on Monday cut the long-term debt and deposit ratings for 26 Italian banks by one to four notches, highlighting the tough environments in Italy and Europe.

The ratings for Italian banks are now among the lowest in advanced European countries, Moody’s said, reflecting a combination of adverse conditions, asset quality deterioration and restricted access to market funding.

Recent efforts by the government and European Central Bank to extend financial support to struggling financial institutions have helped ease some of the pressure on Italian banks, the rating agency said.

However, with the country’s economy back in recession and government austerity measures hurting demand, problem loans and loan-loss provisions are rising, said Johannes Wassenberg, Moody’s managing director for European banks.

“If this limited access to funding persists, the pressure on banks to reduce assets may increase, posing risks to their franchises and earnings,” Mr Wassenberg said.

Some of Italy’s largest financial institutions were covered in the review, including UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo. All of the banks affected now have a negative outlook, which may increase the likelihood of future downgrades.

UniCredit, the country’s largest bank by assets, had its long-term debt rating lowered one notch to A3. Milan-based Intesa, Italy’s second-largest lender, was downgraded to A3 from A2.

The downgrade followed a previous cut on February 13, when the agency lowered the rating of Italy and five other countries, including Spain. At that time, Italy was lowered to A3, and now stands four steps above junk. Fears over the ability of the eurozone’s firewall to shield some countries are being compounded by speculation Greece may leave the eurozone.

 

MOODY’S slashed its credit ratings by up to four notches for 26 Italian banks Monday, including UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo, citing their vulnerability to Italy’s recession and more trouble in the eurozone.

“The ratings for Italian banks are now amongst the lowest within advanced European countries, reflecting these banks’ susceptibility to the adverse operating environments in Italy and Europe,” Moody’s said.

“Banks are vulnerable to the renewed recession in Italy, given their already elevated levels of problem loans and weakened profitability. These risks are exacerbated by investor concerns over the sustainability of the Italian government’s debt burden, which has contributed to the difficult wholesale funding conditions faced by Italian banks.”

The banks included UniCredit, cut to A3 from A2, and Intesa Sanpaolo, also to A3 from A2. The two account for nearly one-third of the Italian market by assets.

Banco Monte dei Paschi, the third largest, went down two levels to Baa3; Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa, the fourth largest, fell to Baa3 from Baa2; and Unione di Banche Italiane, the fifth-largest bank, was cut two levels to Baa2 from A3.

Ten banks saw their ratings newly cut from investment grade to junk-grade, including two that received four-notch reductions: Banco Popolare di Cividale and Banco Popolare di Spoleto, both cut from Baa1 to Ba2.

All of the banks were also put on negative credit watch, a warning that further downgrades were possible.

The potential for new rating cuts “is heightened by the possibility of rapid increases in problem loans, as has been evident following supervisory inspections of certain Italian banks,” Moody’s said.

 

http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Italian-banks-outlooks-remain-negative–PR_244732

Rating Action:

Moody’s downgrades Italian banks; outlooks remain negative

Global Credit Research – 14 May 2012

 

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One Comment

  1. ah ah ah famiglie sull’ASTRICO !! mi sa che non abbiamo neanche la licenza media….

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